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L Introduction
After a steamy romance, Dawn and Gary discovered that Dawn was
pregnant.' After Dawn's child was born, Gary, under court order, began
paying child support.2 When he sought visitation she refused and demanded
a paternity test, correctly predicting that the test would exclude him as the
child's father.3 A court reversed the paternity judgment giving Gary
prospective relief-he no longer had to continue paying support. 4 What
about retroactive relief; did he get back the support he had already paid?
5
This Note will address the question of whether a putative father is
entitled to restitution of child support paid under a paternity judgment that is
subsequently reversed because a paternity test excludes him as the child's
father.6
The advent of DNA testing has uncovered many instances of
misattributed paternity. Indeed, a surprising number of people were fathered
by someone other than the man they believe to be their dad.7 Because DNA
tests are convenient, requiring only a cheek swab of man and child,8
I See In re Haller, 839 A.2d 18, 19 (N.H. 2003) (describing the facts that lead to the eventual
paternity, visitation, and child support enforcement action).
2 Id. at 19.
3 Id. at 19-20.
4 Id. at 20.
5 He did not. See In re Haller, 839 A.2d at 22 (refusing to award restitution because the state
had not been unjustly enriched by the plaintiff).
6 Women must pay child support too, so why not ask the question in sex-neutral terms?
Misattributed maternity is rare. See Ronald K. Henry, The Innocent Third Party: Victims of Paternity
Fraud, 40 FAM L.Q. 51, 74 (2006) (describing hospital safeguards to ensure that mothers leave with the
children they have delivered: The hospital "takes the footprint of the baby, places a wristband on the
mother and the baby, [and] provides twenty-four hour video monitoring of the nursery"); see also
Margaret Cronin Fisk, $2.3M Settlement in Va. Wrong Baby Case, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 2001, at A6
(describing the settlement reached between Paula Johnson and the University of Virginia Medical Center
after a paternity test revealed that she is not biologically related to the child she is raising).
7 See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the
Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 221-22 (2002) (discussing studies showing that
between five and thirty percent of children born into a marriage are "quasi-marital" children); see also
Carolyn Abraham, Mommy's Little Secret, GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 14, 2002, at Fl (noting that Dr.
Jeanette Papp, director of genotyping and sequencing at the University of California Los Angeles,
estimates the misattributed paternity rate to be fifteen percent).
8 See Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part 1. Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-
Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 35, 37 (2003) ("Testing can now be done by simple cheek swab (rather
than drawing blood), only the man and child need be tested (eliminating the need for the mother's
cooperation), and test results are highly dispositive.").
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inexpensive at approximately $100, 9 and widely available online and by mail
order, misattributed paternity has become more likely to be discovered. At
the same time, federal child support enforcement laws have become
increasingly aggressive, which means that paternity is more likely to be
misattributed. The combination-increasing paternity misattribution coupled
with the increasing ease of identifying it-is a recipe that makes our question
ripe for analysis.
Part II of this Note will address child support, misattributed
paternity, and the legal trajectory of our question. Part Inl will address
restitution law; while less prominent than its common law siblings-tort,
contract, and property-restitution is indeed a freestanding body of law with
its own focus, its own rules, and its own precedent. 0 Part IV will identify
and discuss four legal approaches to answering our question. Part V will
consider the child support recipient's restitutionary defense-the change-of-
position defense. A bit about the defendants in our claim before we proceed:
a putative father will usually seek restitution from the child support
recipient;' that recipient will be the state if the mother is on welfare, or the
mother herself if she is not.' 2  A putative father might also seek restitution
from the biological father, but that claim will not be considered here because
it presents a host of different legal issues.'
3
9 See Henry, supra note 6, at 52 ("For less than $100, a DNA test can determine with certainty
whether a particular man is the father of a particular child .. .
10 DoUG RENDLEMAN, REMEDMES 383 (7th ed. 2006).
11 Restitution is usually sought from the child support recipient as opposed to the biological
father for two reasons. First, as a matter of restitution law, the recipient is liable. See RENDLEMAN, supra
note 10, at 386 (stating 'restitution in money' is granting the plaintiff a money judgment measured by the
defendant's unjust enrichment, normally at the plaintiff's expense). Second, the recipient is identifiable.
How can the putative father sue the biological father when he has no idea who the biological father is?
Further, the child's mother might not know who the biological father is. Even if she does know who the
biological father is, she may not know where he is or want to deal with him.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000) ("States . . . shall require, as a condition of providing
assistance to a family under the State program funded under this part, that a member of the family assign
to the State any rights the family member may have... to support from any other person.").
13 Courts have been sympathetic to the putative father's restitution claim against the biological
father. See, e.g., R.A.C. v. P.J.S., 880 A.2d 1179, 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (finding the
statute of limitations on the Parentage Act equitably tolled to allow ex-husband to bring claim against
biological father for restitution of support of child despite child being thirty years old at time of suit); In re
Marriage of Anonymous Wife, 739 P.2d 794, 798-99 (Ariz. 1987) (ruling that doctrine of laches did not
bar former husband from recovering restitution from biological father).
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II. Child Support, Misattributed Paternity, and the Restitution Claim
A. Child Support as a Legal Obligation
Child support, as a public policy, is premised on the uncontroversial
notion that a biological parent-whether or not they have a relationship with
their child-is obligated to pay support. 14 The obligation is "among the most
fundamental obligations recognized by modem society." 15  As such, under
federal and state law, biology alone creates a duty of support-there need not
be any further relationship between the parent and the child. 16  How
important is biology? Even victims of statutory rape and sexual assault have
been required to support their offspring.
17
Child support may be the debtor's most serious obligation. The
debtor may be liable for up to 21 years of support. 18 Wage garnishments for
child support usually will take priority over any other liens against the
debtor. 19 Further, child support is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
20
The "[c]onstitutional and statutory prohibitions that forbid
imprisoning a debtor to collect a civil debt" do not necessarily extend to
child support debtors. 21 Rather, child support debtors "are often imprisoned
14 See Tirey v. Tirey, 806 N.E.2d 360, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]here is a strong public
policy in favor of parents supporting their biological children.").
is Moss v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 396, 410 (Cal. 1998).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G) (describing the presumption of paternity in certain cases);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (finding that the equal protection clause requires the same duty
of support be imposed with respect to marital and nonmarital children); see also Ellen Goodman, What
makes a father?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2001, http://www.ancpr.org/what-makes_a_father.htm (asking
"[hlow come the same DNA test that can force one man into paternal obligation can't automatically free
another?") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
17 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993) (finding a male
victim of statutory rape who was twelve years-old at the time of the rape liable for support from the date
of the child's birth). See also Ellen London, Comment, A Critique of the Strict Liability Standard for
Determining Child Support in Cases of Male Victims of Sexual Assault and Statutory Rape, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1957, 1958-59 (2004) (arguing that holding male victims of sexual assault and statutory rape strictly
liable for child support perpetuates outdated ideas about gender).
18 See, e.g., N.Y. C.L.S. Family Ct. Act § 413(l)(a) (2007) (stating "the parents of a child under
the age of twenty-one years are chargeable with the support of such child").
19 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT § 14-14-105(1) (2002) (stating that arrearages for child support
"shall have Priority over any gamishment, lien, or income assignment").
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006) (providing that an individual who has a discharge of debt
through bankruptcy is not allowed to discharge a child support obligation); see, e.g., Balthazor v.
Winnebago County, 36 B.R. 656, 659 (Bankr. D. Wis. 1984) (finding that child support obligations are
not dischargeable debts under the Bankruptcy Code).
21 RENDLEMAN, supra note 10, at 344.
TAXATION WITHOUT DUPLICATION
for contempt. 2 2  The California Supreme Court rejected a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge to contempt sanctions for failure to pay child support,
analogizing a parent's duty to pay child support to other forms of
constitutionally permissible enforced labor," including military and jury
23service.
1. The Impact of Federal Law
Federal child support laws have become increasingly aggressive
since the 1970s. Under Title IV-D of the 1974 Social Security Act, welfare
recipients must assign their right to collect child support over to the state as
reimbursement for welfare expenses.24 The Family Support Act, which was
enacted in 1988, required states to set targets for paternity establishment. 5
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 required states to
implement a number of procedures for securing those paternity
establishments, including procedures for voluntary paternity
acknowledgment and default judgments.26  Finally, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),21
enacted in 1996, instituted performance-based incentives relating to
"establishment of paternities, establishment of child support orders,
collections on current child support payments, collections on past-due child
support payments (i.e., arrearages), and cost effectiveness." 28  One glaring
omission from these performance metrics is that states are not expected to
track the rate at which paternity is misattributed.29 Indeed, states risk losing
22 Id.
23 See Moss v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 4th 396, 410 (Cal. 1998) (stating support of a minor child
is as important a social obligation as compulsory military service, enforced labor as punishment for a
crime, jury service, and other constitutionally permissible enforced labor).
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(3) (2000) ("States ... shall require, as a condition of providing
assistance to a family under the State program funded under this part, that a member of the family assign
to the State any rights the family member may have.., to support from any other person.").
25 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (current version codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (2001)).
26 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(5)(C), (a)(5)(H) (2000) (providing procedures for establishing
paternity through voluntary acknowledgment and default).
27 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
28 CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT CHILD SUPPORT AND BEYOND 22
(Susan Boriotti & Donna Dennis eds., Novinka Books 2003).
29 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (failing to require states to
track rates of paternity misattribution).
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federal incentive money should they fail to establish paternity in 90% of
welfare cases. 30  The results of such a rule were manifested in 2002 when
then-California governor Gray Davis vetoed a bill aimed at reducing
paternity fraud because increasing the accuracy of paternity establishments
would jeopardize $40 million in federal funding.
31
As of 2003, total child support arrearages were approximately $70
billion, 70% of which was owed by debtors with incomes below $10,000 per
year.32  One commentator explains that "the desperate economic
circumstances of most fathers of children on welfare almost ensures the
failure of the child support system to effectively address child poverty."
33
B. Misattributed Paternity
The fact that 10% of us were fathered by someone other than the
man we believe to be 'Dad' should not be surprising-human desire for
multiple partners is far more natural than monogamy.34 Indeed, the birds and
the bees are not monogamous either.35 Of the 310,490 paternity tests
conducted by the American Association of Blood Banks in 2001, nearly one-
third of putative fathers were excluded, clearly demonstrating the axiomatic
principle that where paternity misattribution is suspected, error rates are
much higher.36 One commentator estimates that the number of misattributed
paternities may exceed one million.
37
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 609(a)(8), 652(g)(1) (imposing a penalty based on failure to comply with the
statute).
31 A.B. 2240, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002); see also Cheryl Wetzstein, Dads 'By
Default' Hail New Law, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at A8 (discussing then-governor Gray Davis'
decision to veto paternity fraud bill).
32 Henry, supra note 6, at 62; Sherri Z. Heller, The Story Behind the numbers: Who Owes the
Child Support Debt?, at 1 (Aug. 13, 2004), http:flwww.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/polIM2004/im-04-
04.htm (follow "The Story Behind the Numbers, Who Owes the Child Support Debt?" hyperlink) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
33 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement,
and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 352 (2005).
34 See generally DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTON, THE MYTH OF MONOGAMY:
FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (lst ed. 2001).
35 See Abraham, supra note 7, at F1 (describing a study in which the DNA of 4,000 mammalian
species was tested, and resulted in the finding that "[b]irds, bees, snails, snakes, fish, frogs ... not even
mites are monogamous").
36 AM. Ass'N OF BLOOD BANKS, ANNUAL REP. SUMMARY FOR TESTING tN 2001 1-3 (2002),
http://www.dnatestingcentre.com/AABB/aabbOl.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
37 Henry, supra note 6, at 60.
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Neither federal law nor the law of any state requires a paternity test
to establish paternity. 38 Instead, paternity is most commonly established by
the marital presumption, the voluntary (often, delivery-room)
acknowledgment,39 judicial determination (very often by default),4° and
finally, by behavior, more specifically, by a man holding a child out as his
own.4' Given paternity testing's accuracy and convenience, reliance on these
other methods is like using the hand across the forehead in lieu of the
thermometer.
There are at least four arguments as to why misattributed paternity is
a problem. First, children and fathers are deprived of a relationship with one
38 Instead, a party may request genetic testing upon a showing of good cause alleging or denying
paternity. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(i) (2007).
39 Anne Greenwood, Predatory Paternity Establishment: A Critical Analysis of the
Acknowledgment of Paternity Process in Texas, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 427-28 (2004) (arguing that to
be truly voluntary, an acknowledgment must follow a full disclosure of the facts).
40 In California, as of 2003 over 70% of paternity judgments were issued by default. ELAINE
SORENSON ET AL., URBAN INST., EXAMINING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN CALIFORNIA: THE
COLLEC'rmiBLITY STUDY, at ES-16 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished study), available at
http://www.canadiancrc.com/PDFs/ ExamininingChildSupport_ ArrearsCalifornia_2003-
05collectibility.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
41 Roberts, supra note 8, at 3.
Unif. Parentage Act § 4(4) (1973) has been adopted in 19 states. In recent articles, family law
professors--expanding on the "fatherhood by nurture rather than nature" idea-have proposed
considerable redefinition of the rights and obligations of biological fathers. The proposals rest on the
feminist idea that the mother, because she carries the child, has superior or exclusive parental rights.
Under their schemes, fathers would, in effect, acquire additional parental rights through their relationships
with mothers. Accepting that mens' parental rights are limited, and can be redefined, the corollary can be
accepted; that is, mens' parental obligations can be redefined too.
Melanie B. Jacobs proposes that a biological father should have an absolute right of visitation
but no right to custody. Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social
Paternity, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 809, 852-56 (2006). Katharine Baker proposes that a biological father should
have no absolute parental rights, but should be obligated to pay a child support tax. Katharine K. Baker,
Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1, 45-48 (2004). Nancy Dowd, similarly, proposes that a biological father should have no
absolute parental rights, but should have the full responsibility of paying child support. Nancy E. Dowd,
Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 917 (2006).
Interestingly, though their policy proposals starkly contrast with the proposals of those favoring equal
parental rights, much like many equal rights proponents, Dowd and Jacobs advocate mandatory paternity
testing. Dowd views paternity testing as favorable to the marital paternity presumption. Id. at 929.
Jacobs likes mandatory paternity testing to prevent later paternity disestablishment. Melanie B. Jacobs,
When Daddy Doesn't Want to Be Daddy Anymore: An Argument Against Paternity Fraud Claims, 16
YALE L.J. & FEMINISM 193, 201 (2004) (arguing for mandatory paternity testing to prevent paternity
disestablishment).
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another.42 Second, families are set up for an emotional bombshell should the
truth be discovered.43 Third, the obligation of support is placed on the wrong
man.44 Fourth, the man who should fulfill that obligation, the child's father,
is allowed to ignore it.45 The child support debtor whose paternity has been
misattributed is like every other taxpayer other than the child's parents-the
child is not his. The burden of supporting that child, however, is largely his;
in effect, he is saddled with a disproportionate tax.
On the other hand, from the child support recipient's perspective,
misattributed paternity is largely irrelevant if a misattributed putative father
will pay the same support as the biological father. Of course, should the
misattributed putative father be easier to collect from or have a larger
income, he is a favorable source of support. While the threat of losing
support prospectively as a result of a paternity disestablishment keeps
misattributed paternity from being completely irrelevant, any risk of
prospective loss can be mitigated by collection from the biological father.46
Misattributed paternity becomes considerably more relevant to the
recipient when the error puts their child support in jeopardy retroactively,
that is, if they will have to make restitution to the misattributed debtor should
the error be discovered. Once again, this paper's question is whether a
putative father is entitled to restitution of child support paid under a paternity
judgment that is subsequently reversed because a paternity test excludes him
as the child's father.47 That question's practical import is that a negative
response tolerates the status quo by allowing misattributed paternity to
remain largely irrelevant to the recipient. An affirmative response,
conversely, might prompt a fundamental change in the way paternity is
established. If misattributed paternity became a problem, not just for the
debtor, but also for the recipient, paternity testing would be the solution.
42 Henry, supra note 6, at 68 (advocating the position that the anger and resentment which flows
from forced involuntary payments necessarily produces a worse relationship between a man and child
than a relationship entered into voluntarily by the man).
43 See Martin Kasindorf, Men Wage Battle on 'Paternity Fraud', USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2002, at
A23 (describing one man's reaction to his paternity being misattributed as "[an acid sense of betrayal.").
" Henry, supra note 6, at 52 (describing a victim of paternity fraud as a man who "is indentured
with coercively enforced obligations for eighteen to twenty-one years for someone else's child.").
45 Id. at 55 (explaining that once a man becomes a victim of paternity fraud, he has virtually no
options at law to remedy the mistake).
46 Suits to establish paternity may be brought at any time before a child is eighteen. See 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A)(i) (stating that procedures regarding paternity establishment are permitted at any
time before the age of eighteen).
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18, cmt. 12
(Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 2001) (noting a hypothetical under similar conditions that both asks this
question and answers it in the affirmative).
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Arguments for mandatory 4paternity testing have been made quite effectively,
with numerous rationales.4
C. The Restitution Claim
Our question jumps ahead to the misattributed putative father's third
and final step in seeking redress. His first step, of course, is discovering the
error-he needs to get a paternity test. His second step is disestablishing
paternity. Because of barriers to disestablishing paternity, misattributed
child support debtors may not be able to obtain prospective relief from child
support orders, let alone retroactive relief.49 Approximately one third of
states have no specific statutory processes for rescinding paternity
acknowledgments.5° In states which have adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act, a putative father may have a small window from the date of the
paternity judgment to bring a disestablishment claim,5' though often
misattributed putative fathers will not discover the error until many years
later.
Several states have statutorily addressed the effect of paternity
disestablishment on support obligations. The statutes can be distinguished
by whether prospective relief is mandatory52 or discretionary. 53  The issue
48 See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship In An Age Of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1024 (2003) (arguing
for mandatory paternity testing to provide secure parent-child relationships); Henry, supra note 6, at 52
(arguing for mandatory paternity testing to protect men from paternity fraud); Dowd, supra note 40, at
929 (arguing for mandatory paternity testing as favorable to the marital paternity presumption as a means
of ensuring that children have a source of support); Greenwood, supra note 39, at 458 (concluding that
paternity testing should be mandatory in part to prevent mothers from committing paternity fraud);
Jacobs, supra note 41, at 201 (arguing for mandatory paternity testing to prevent paternity
disestablishment); Niccol D. Kording, Little White Lies That Destroy Children's Lives-Recreating
Paternity Fraud Laws To Protect Children's Interests, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 237, 266 (2004) (arguing that
absent an existing father-child relationship paternity testing should be mandatory to prevent family
discord caused by the discovery of misattributed paternity); Kristen Santillo, Disestablishment of
Paternity and the Future of Child Support Obligations, 37 FAM. L.Q. 503, 513 (2003) (noting that
paternity testing should be mandatory in cases where a father is signing a voluntary acknowledgment).
49 Tresa Baldas, Parent Trap? Litigation Explodes Over Paternity Fraud, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 10,
2006 (describing the frustration attorneys and mens' rights advocates have with the inability to get even
prospective relief in cases of misattributed paternity).
50 Roberts, supra note 8, at 35.
51 See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 7541(b) (1997) (requiring a husband's motion for disestablishment
to be filed by time the child reaches two years old).
52 See, e.g., Iowa Code § 600B.41A(4) (2005) (giving mandatory relief from arrearages and
future obligations should paternity be disestablished).
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appears to be moot in both Arkansas 54 and Georgia,55 where statutes
expressly limit retroactive relief to arrearages; thus, these states create an odd
situation in which the delinquent child support debtor benefits by being
relieved of past obligations, while the debtor who has fulfilled his obligations
cannot recover restitution.
III. Restitution Law
A. Restitution as a Freestanding Body of Law
Restitution, though less prominent than its common law siblings,
tort, contract, and property, is a freestanding body of law with its own focus,
its own rules, and its own precedent.56 Indeed, it is the fourth corner of the
common law. We might say that contract law concerns duties created by
promises; tort law concerns duties sans promises; and property law concerns
ownership of real and personal property. Freestanding restitution law
concerns benefits, specifically those benefits conferred by plaintiffs which
unjustly enrich defendants.
57
Restitution law covers legal problems that are not covered by other
substantive areas of the common law, a concept demonstrated by the
following simple example. Consider, for instance, a bank that mistakenly
58makes a deposit into a customer's account. No gift was intended, no
contract between the parties was breached, no tort was committed, and no
property right was infringed.59 However, because the customer was unjustly
enriched, he must make restitution. A restitution problem is solved with a
two-part inquiry into the following question: When a party has conferred a
benefit upon another, does justice require that the benefit be returned?6°
53 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STATE. ANN. 45/7(b-5) (1998) (allowing a putative father to
receive prospective relief from support obligations should he be excluded by DNA test).
5 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-115(f)(1)(D) (2007) (providing that a misattributed father who
has already paid child support is not entitled to a refund of those payments); see also State v. Phillippe,
914 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Ark. 1996) (finding that the statute precluded an award of restitution of child
support paid to the state by a misattributed putative father).
5 See GA. CODE ANN. 19-54-7(d) (2002) (providing that a misattributed father who has already
paid child support is not entitled to a refund of those payments).
56 RENDLEMAN, supra note 10, at 383.
57 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1, cmt. b
(Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000).
58 RENDLEMAN, supra note 10, at 383.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 385 n.l1.
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The first part is the threshold question, indicating that if the
defendant has not received a benefit, then there cannot have been
enrichment. 61  A benefit is either an addition to the defendant's wealth or a
requested performance rendered to the defendant. 62  The first part of the
inquiry is easier to answer than the second. The wealth of the child support
recipient, be it the mother or the state, will have been increased in the form
of a direct benefit, money.63 Furthermore, the payment of support is a
performance requested by the defendant that will have been rendered. The
second part of the inquiry, the justice question, is tougher. Reasonable
people are apt to disagree about what justice requires and thus coming to a
consensus can be relatively difficult. Thankfully, in answering the justice
question, courts are able to rely upon the confining and informative strictures
of rules and precedent. 64
B. The Subsequent-Reversal-of-Judgment Rule
Indeed, in considering our question, a court need only apply the
well-established subsequent-reversal-of-judgment rule.65  The Supreme
61 Id.
62 See GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.8 (1995) (determining that a benefit is
either an addition to the defendant's wealth, or a performance requested by the defendant that has been
rendered).
63 Cf. Audrey G. v. Robert T., 144 Misc. 2D 313, 314 (N.Y. Misc. 1989) (finding no unjust
enrichment in a claim for restitution of child support paid by a misattributed putative father to a mother
because the money was paid for the child's benefit, and, according to the court, must have been assumed
to have been spent on the child). The court did not explain the definition of benefit upon which it relied.
Id. Inducing a workable definition from the court's analysis is difficult-the court would not, of course,
conclude that a parent need not pay their child's tuition, or medical bills, simply because the service had
been provided for the child's, rather than the parent's, benefit.
64 Courts are also not given questions that are so discretion-maximizing as to make uniformity-
itself an element of justice-impossible.
65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, Apr. 1, 2001) (stating the rule that "[a] transfer or taking of property, in compliance with or
otherwise in consequence of a judgment that is subsequently reversed or avoided, gives the disadvantaged
party a claim in restitution to the extent necessary to avoid unjust enrichment"); RESTATEMENT OF
RESTrrUTION §§ 73-74 (1937) (stating the rule that "a person is entitled to restitution of a benefit which
he has conferred upon another, induced thereto by a levy under or a threat of execution of a judgment or
process which is void as to him, if the execution thereof would subject him to serious risk of substantial
loss" and "[a] person who has conferred a benefit upon another in compliance with a judgment, or whose
property has been taken thereunder, is entitled to restitution if the judgment is reversed or set aside, unless
restitution would be inequitable or the parties contract that payment is to be final; if the judgment is
modified, there is a right to restitution of the excess"); see also PALMER, supra note 62, at § 9.9(b)
(explaining that "[a]lmost as a matter of course, restitution usually has been granted of money paid or
other benefits transferred under a judgment subsequently reversed").
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Court has stated the rule as "what has been given or paid under the
compulsion of a judgment the court will restore when its judgment has been
set aside and justice requires restitution. '"66  Let us again consider an
example: An insurer was found liable to a couple on a death claim after their
daughter's prolonged, unexplainable absence. When the daughter turned
up, the judgment against the insurer was set aside.68 Under the subsequent-
reversal-of-judgment rule, the couple had to return the payments that the
insurer made upon hearing of their daughter's initial disappearance. 69
The court, in the first go-round, was put in the unenviable position of
determining liability without the dispositive fact. That is, they did not have
the daughter's body. When courts must determine paternity, that dispositive
fact is a paternity test.70  Given that courts make decisions based on
incomplete information, the best the legal system can do is make corrections
when new facts become known. This, of course, explains why the judgment
against the insurer was set aside. Just setting aside the judgment, however,
without also awarding the insurer restitution would have not only been an
empty gesture and not a correction-the insurer would have been
unreimbursed just the same. Likewise, in our claim, the error is not
corrected until the money has been returned to the former child support
debtor, money that he should not have paid in the first place. The
subsequent-reversal-of-judgment rule is an absolute necessity in a just legal
system, and as such, is applied "almost as a matter of course.'
' 1
The rule, however, is not applied as a matter of course when a
paternity judgment has been set aside and the payor seeks restitution of child
support paid. To be sure, courts have straightforwardly applied the rule,
making little "reference to the particular nature of the controversy.
7 2
66 See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 197 (1939) (finding that funds paid to the district
court during a ratemaking dispute should have remained with the court as a possible source of restitution
pending the outcome of the rate determination).
67 See Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 550 S.W.2d 558, 558-59 (Ky. 1977) (finding
that, when an insurance judgment was set aside because the presumed-dead daughter was found alive,
money paid in fulfillment of that judgment had to be repaid).
68 Id. at 559-60.
69 Id.
70 This paper argues that using any method other than a paternity test is like "using the hand
across the forehead in lieu of the thermometer." See supra Part lf.B. Courts do, however, use other
methods, such as "the marital presumption, the voluntary ... acknowledgement, judicial determination
,[and] behavior." See supra notes 39-41.
71 PALMER, supra 62, at § 9.9(b).
72 In re Marriage of Cook, 663 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding restitution of
child support paid during pendency of appeal before judgment was reversed). See, e.g., Kohl v.
Amundson, 620 N.w.2d 606 (S.D. 2001) (ordering mother to pay restitution to putative father for child
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However, as discussed in more detail below, many courts have failed to
apply the rule and denied restitution.
C. Permutations
What explains the discrepancy? Before we tackle that question, let
us answer its corollary, an easier question: What does not explain the
discrepancy? The facts of the individual cases. Our claim can have a host of
permutations. First, the child support recipient could be the mother or the
state. Second, paternity might have been established by behavior, marriage,
a paternity acknowledgment, or some other judicial mechanism, like default.
Third, the putative father might not necessarily be the party who moved to
disestablish his paternity; it may have been the mother, or even the biological
father.73
The basic claim could contain a number of different fact patterns,
although, in some, the plaintiff might be more sympathetic than in others.
Some readers might sympathize with Gary, the plaintiff in this Note's
introductory scenario. A less sympathetic plaintiff might have voluntarily
acknowledged paternity despite knowing that the child might not be his,
established a relationship with the child, and then moved to disestablish
paternity. While the degree to which the plaintiff is sympathetic is a
reasonable explanation for the case discrepancy, it is not the correct one.
Cases with nearly identical fact patterns have reached opposite results.
Indeed, it is not the facts at all that explain the discrepancy. The cases are
distinguishable by the legal analyses used to resolve them.
IV. Four Approaches to Answering the Question
The analysis in this Note is not exhaustive, but rather is focused on
restitution. Supporting the contention that freestanding restitution is being
ignored when misattributed putative fathers seek restitution of child support,
support paid under a default paternity judgment subsequently vacated); In re Marriage of Hardt, 693 P.2d
1386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (ordering mother to pay restitution to former husband for child support paid
under a void dissolution decree); Mathison v. Clearwater County Dep't of Welfare, 412 N.W.2d 812
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (ordering state to pay restitution to putative father for child support paid under a
default paternity judgment subsequently vacated); Cauthen v. Yates, 716 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. Ct. App.
1988) (ordering mother to pay restitution to putative father for child support paid under a paternity
judgment subsequently reversed).
73 See generally Roberts, supra note 8.
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one commentator categorized the legal approaches taken in considering these
claims without even mentioning freestanding restitution.74
A. Following the Rule
As previously discussed, one approach is to follow the rule of
restitution. The court must correctly identify the claim as one involving
restitution law. The court then must identify restitution law's applicable rule,
the subsequent-reversal-of-judgment rule, and straightforwardly apply it
making little "reference to the particular nature of the controversy." 75 These
opinions are notably brief.
76
B. Fraud as a Prerequisite to Restitution
Probably the more common approach to answering our question
involves making fraud a prerequisite to restitution as a remedy. Courts using
this approach treat restitution as a remedy alone, ignoring restitution as a
freestanding body of law.77 This error leads courts to substitute tort as the
applicable substantive body, thus making fraud a prerequisite to recovery. If
the defendant, the child support recipient, is the state, the state will not have
committed fraud. If the defendant is the mother, she may well have
committed fraud, but proving it, especially years after the fact is difficult. In
cases in which the mother has clearly committed fraud, courts have
maneuvered to deny restitution. For example, in Miller v. Miller, a paternity
test excluded an ex-husband; he then sought restitution of child support he
had paid his ex-wife.7 8 The court denied the claim, explaining that
restitutionary relief was only available for extrinsic fraud-fraud outside of
the trial. 79 The court explained that while the ex-wife may have committed
extrinsic fraud before and during the marriage, it was not "perpetrated ... in
74 See Andrew S. Epstein, The Parent Trap: Should A Man Be Allowed To Recoup Child
Support Payments If He Discovers He Is Not The Biological Father Of The Child?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
655, 658-67 (2004) (observing that courts use five analytical approaches to resolving child support
restitution cases: vested rights, res judicata, civil procedure Rule 60, best interests of the child, and
fundamental fairness).
75 See In re Marriage of Cook, 663 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding restitution of
child support paid during pendency of appeal before judgment was reversed).
76 See case cited at infra note 72 (describing cases following the subsequent-reversal-of-judgment
rule of restitution).
77 See supra Part I.A. (discussing restitution as a freestanding body of law).
78 Miller v. Miller, 956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998).
79 Id. at 905.
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the procurement of the support order.' 80  Making fraud a prerequisite to
restitution-whether the defendant is the state or mother-often results in
denial of the claim.
Let us return to the case that served as the introduction to this Note,
In Re Haller.8' The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied the restitution
claim against the state, explaining that "to be entitled to restitution there must
not only be unjust enrichment, but also the person sought to be charged must
have wrongfully secured a benefit. '82  The state, of course, had not
wrongfully secured the support in the sense that they had committed fraud;
rather, the state had collected support based on, in part, the debtor's
83acknowledgment of paternity. His acknowledgment may have been the
result of the mother's fraud, but she was not the defendant. In Smith v. Ohio
Department of Human Services, an Ohio appellate court denied a restitution
claim against the state, and, referring to the fact that the agency had not
committed fraud, gave the following explanation: "[T]he [plaintiff's] unjust
impoverishment does not necessarily correspond to any unjust enrichment on
the part of the state."84
In Atcherian v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court awarded restitution,
but only retroactive to the date that the putative father brought the motion to
vacate the judgment, explaining that full restitution would only be available
had there been "agency misconduct or impropriety." 85 In a twist on the fraud
analysis, a Virginia trial court, in Buck v. Buck, denied restitution to a
misattributed putative father, explaining that "equity" prevented finding that
the mother had committed fraud because the putative father himself had been
suspicious that she had committed fraud and yet still had entered into the
86divorce decree which provided for the support.
1. An Institutional Defense
Making fraud a prerequisite to restitution when the state is the
defendant amounts to an institutional restitutionary defense. When a state
so Id.
SI In re Hailer, 839 A.2d 18 (N.H. 2003).
82 Id. at 20 (citing 66 Am. JUR. 2D Restitution and Implied Contracts §10 (2001)).
83 Id. at 19-20.
84 Smith v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 658 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
85 Atcherian v. State Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div., 14 P.3d 970, 976
(Alaska 2000).
8 Buck v. Buck, 35 Va. Cir. 561, 562 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1993).
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collects child support from a misattributed putative father it is not
committing fraud, it is acting under a legal duty. The Atcherian court
explained that the plaintiff had not given a compelling reason to hold the
state liable for "undertaking legally authorized collection efforts." 87 The
explanation ignores restitution law's central question. Unjust enrichment is
that compelling reason; indeed, it is the substantive breach, which gives rise
to the restitutionary remedy.88 If a judgment is reversed then any transfer
under that judgment, to an individual or the state, was "improper."'89 As
such, "the misapplication of the state's coercive means deprives them of their
ordinary justification as legalized coercion. 90
In fact, institutions should be more likely to be held accountable for
a mistake (misattributed paternity) than individuals, because of superior
mistake-avoiding capability and superior ability to insure against loss. 91
Moreover, an institution should be held strictly liable when "mistakes are
frequent and of only moderate magnitude from the institution's point of
view, while rather infrequent, but significant from the viewpoint of the
individual. 9 2 The mistake is of minimal magnitude to the child support
enforcement agency because the putative father is not necessarily any less
favorable a debtor than the biological father. In light of the rate of
misattributed paternity, the mistake is frequent from the state's point of view.
The child support debtor's perspective is the polar opposite: To the debtor,
the error's magnitude is enormous and the frequency is rare.
2. Mistake Alone Justifies Recovery
Fraud should not be a prerequisite to restitution as a remedy when
the defendant is the mother, in part because the fraud inquiry is troublesome.
To the extent that a mother, without divulging her sexual history, wrongly
allows a man to erroneously acknowledge his paternity, she has committed
fraud by concealing a material fact to induce the putative father to act to his
87 Atcheian, 14 P.3d at 976.
88 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, Intro. to Topic 3




91 HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 51-62 (2004).
92 Id. at 64.
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detriment.93 However, this raises two other important questions: Is it fair to
expect women to divulge their sexual history when men are not expected to
divulge theirs? Moreover, is it realistic to expect a mother to divulge her
sexual history to a potential father of her child given the possible harm to
their relationship? Humans may not be monogamous, but infidelity is not
accepted easily.
More importantly, fraud should not be a prerequisite to recovery
when the defendant is the mother because mistake alone is grounds for
recovery, and every case of misattributed paternity involves either fraud or
mistake. If the mother did not conceal the material fact-that more than one
man may be the father-then she at least mistakenly identified the wrong
man as the father of her child. Absent a memory-incapacitating cause94 or
absent a paternity test, a mother who has not been monogamous knows that
the putative father may have been misidentified. If the putative father
himself acknowledged paternity, he, of course, was mistaken. The fraud
inquiry is unnecessary. 95
Mistake is grounds for recovery: "[R]estitution may be required
when the person benefiting from another's mistake knew about the mistake.
.. 96 Moreover, the recipient should be deprived of a benefit obtained by a
material misrepresentation even if she believed her statements to be true.97
Indeed, a recipient may be liable for restitution even if the transferor
93 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (8th Ed. 2004) (defining fraud as a "knowing
misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her
detriment").
94 See Bouchard v. Frost, 840 A.2d 109, 112 n.2 (Me. 2004) (denying the plaintiff's restitution
claim for child support payments made to the Department of Human Services). During her interview for
public assistance benefits, the mother had submitted an affidavit identifying the plaintiff as the child's
father and denying that anyone else could be the child's father. Id. at 110. When a paternity test later
excluded the plaintiff as the child's father, the mother claimed she had been sexually assaulted by a
stranger during the period of conception but had blocked the assault from her mind. Id. at 111 n.2. The
court denied the plaintiff's restitution claim. Id. at 112.
95 At least one state has criminalized paternity fraud, so the distinction between fraud and
mistake might be important for a reason entirely separate from the restitution claim. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-37-2-2.1(0 (2006) (making paternity fraud a misdemeanor, rendering the distinction between
fraud and mistake important for a reason entirely separate from the restitution claim). In Mississippi and
Rhode Island, paternity fraud is punishable as perjury. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-9-37 (1962)
(articulating that paternity fraud is punishable as perjury); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-22 (2003) (same).
96 First Nationwide Sav. v. Perry, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a
trustee had been unjustly enriched by selling land he knew belonged to the beneficiary). See generally
JIM FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 43.3 (2d ed. 2006) (describing remedies for fraud).
97 See FISCHER, supra note 96, at § 120.3 (discussing negligent misrepresentation).
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negligently conferred the benefit by failing to ascertain the facts.98 In Naugle
v. O'Connell, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that trustees, despite
negligently failing to determine a retiree's "complete employment history"
before granting him benefits, were entitled to restitution of erroneous
retirement benefit payments. 99 A man who acknowledges paternity without
first determining his partner's sexual history has an even stronger claim to
restitution because he has not been negligent at all-he can only know his
partner's sexual history to the extent that she accurately shares it with him.
3. Explaining the Error
Courts err by making fraud a prerequisite to restitution, and ignoring
that mistake alone justifies recovery. The plaintiff may seek "restitution as a
freestanding remedy based on the defendant's unjust enrichment alone; the
defendant's breach of contract, tort, or violation of plaintiffs property is not
a prerequisite."'°° Professor Doug Rendleman, an adviser to the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, explains that "[i]f restitution
were a tort ... the American Law Institute could scuttle its Restatement."'10 1
What accounts for the error?
One explanation is that courts are avoiding restitution law's arguably
more difficult justice question in lieu of tort law's fraud question. Could it
be easier to decide whether there has been concealment of a material fact and
inducement than it is to decide what justice requires? Probably not. After
all, the tort path does not sidestep the justice question. Take proximate
causation: A judge will have to decide if the but-for cause of a defendant's
harm is attenuated to a degree such that it should give rise to liability.1°2
That is a justice inquiry; the judge is deciding whether it would be just to
impose liability for the creation of a particular cause. Application of law
necessarily requires that justice be considered.
Maybe ignorance is a better explanation. Restitution is no longer a
regular part of the law school curriculum. 0 3  Restitution scholarship has
atrophied. Andrew Kull, Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Restitution,
98 See id. § 43.3 (referencing Naugle v. O'Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1398 (10th Cir. 1987)).
99 Naugle, 833 F.2d. at 1398.
1'o RENDLEMAN, supra note 10, at 383.
101 Id. at 404.
102 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B(f) (1979) (stating that it is the duty of the court
to determine whether "defendant's conduct is a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff').
'03 My first exposure to restitution as a freestanding body of law was in Professor Doug
Rendleman's Remedies course. Generally, restitution is not taught as a specific course.
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puts it bluntly: "American lawyers today (judges and law professors
included) do not know what restitution is. ' 4 Part of the problem might be
the terminology. Restitution is the term for both a substantive body of law
and its remedy. Restitution law might have been better served had it been
named unjust enrichment, a more descriptive term that would have
distinguished the substantive body of law from its remedy. 10 5 Indeed, the
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
contemplated omitting the term restitution from the Restatement's title;
however, they decided that there was too much inertia to change now.'
°6
Still another explanation for fraud being a prerequisite to restitution
analysis is result-first judging. Judges might be thinking: Someone has to
pay child support. So what if the guy paying is not the father, he slept with
the mother, and his money is just as green as the father's is. Someone else
might be paying support for one of his kids, therefore, it all evens out. 10 7 If
results-first judging is what is going on, then it is reckless for the restitution
approach to require fraud analysis. These courts could avoid making bad
precedent by playing the policy trump card.
C. The Policy Trump Card
The Virginia Supreme Court, in denying a former husband
restitution of spousal support paid under a judgment subsequently reversed,
explained that "divorce and related matters constitute a distinct category, one
not always subject to the body of jurisprudence generally applicable to
common law suits and actions."108 This approach is an improvement because
it leaves restitution precedent relatively unscathed. Plus, it is more
transparent; the court is admitting that it is forcing its desired result. Still,
the approach is troubling in two respects. First, individual plaintiffs are
denied justice. Second, the policy analyses courts have relied upon are
myopic. We will consider two examples.
104 Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1195 (1995).
105 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1, cmt. b
(Discussion Draft, Mar. 31, 2000).
106 Id. § 1, cmt. c.
107 If the description does not reflect the attitude of courts, it at least reflects Child Support
Enforcement Agency culture, a culture which viewed putative fathers as "riffraff." See SOLOMON-FEARS,
supra note 28, at 48 (describing the attitude towards putative fathers).
log Reid v. Reid, 429 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Va. 1993).
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1. Incentives
The Hailer court justified denying a misattributed putative father
restitution from the state, explaining that to award restitution would create a
"perverse incentive structure" in that neither the mother nor the father would
need to take paternity establishment seriously.' °9  The court feared an
incentive without a reward.
A mother receiving welfare does not receive child support from the
putative father, so she need not take paternity establishment seriously
because misattributing paternity will not affect her receipt of benefits.
Similarly, the prospect of recovering restitution is hardly an incentive for a
man to disregard whether he is being misidentified as a father. Even if he
could recover restitution, legal fees, and prejudgment interest, he would not
have profited. Moreover, he would have exposed himself to a uniquely
painful emotional bombshell,"o wage garnishment, and jail. The court failed
to mention the perverse incentive structure its decision perpetuated. A state
can be indifferent to the accuracy of paternity establishment so long as it will
be able to keep the child support it collects from fathers and non-fathers
alike."'11
In McBride v. Boughton, the putative father had supported the
mother and child voluntarily rather than under legal compulsion.!1 The
mother told the plaintiff that he was the father of her child, convincing him to
move back to the United States from Chile." 3 He worked for the first year of
the child's life so the mother could stay home with the child."14 In the
second year of the child's life, he became a full-time caregiver and the
mother returned to work.' '5  Then the mother told the plaintiff she was
moving the child away." 6  In response, the plaintiff filed a paternity
proceeding seeking custody." 7 When a paternity test excluded him as the
'09 In re Hailer, 839 A.2d 18, 21-22 (N.H. 2003).
11 See Kasindorf, supra note 43, at A23 (recounting stories of men who feel deceived by their
partner after discovering that they are not the child's biological father).
III See Part ll.B. (discussing the irrelevance of paternity determination to the person receiving the
child support payments).
112 McBride v. Boughton, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
''3 Id. at 117.





father, he sought restitution from the mother of the money he had spent
supporting the child."
18
The court denied his claim, explaining that its decision would
incentivize men to get paternity tests if they were unsure as to their own
paternity-thus preventing paternity disestablishment. 1 9 The court thought
its decision was consistent with the legislature's intent to prevent
disestablishment, as evidenced by the two-year statute of limitations in which
a married man could contest his own child's paternity. 120 Given that 71% of
paternity judgments in the state were issued by default though, the court's
reading is inconsistent with the state's broader child support enforcement
scheme. 21 A better reading of legislative intent is that the state wanted to
maximize child support collection. That end, in fact, would not best be
served by incentivizing paternity testing because men who would otherwise
have become child support debtors would be excluded as fathers, as the
plaintiff in this case would have been had he gotten a paternity test.
Moreover, the court ignored the disincentive it created for mothers to ensure
that they were in fact collecting support from biological fathers. By allowing
the mother to retain the benefit, i.e. support, the court rewarded her paternity
fraud, thus setting up the very situation the court was hoping to prevent-
future paternity disestablishment.
2. Man versus Child
One experienced family attorney chalks up the indifference to
accurate paternity establishment to a "man vs. child" mentality. 122  That
mentality is explicit in McBride v. Boughton-the court explained that
paternity disestablishment must be disincentivized because even a possibility
of "potential emotional and psychic costs to the child [caused by the severing
of a parental bond] are far more significant than any financial injury a grown
118 Id. at 118-19.
119 Id. at 124.
120 Id.; see also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540-7541 (1992) (stating the statute of limitations for
married men to contest paternity).
121 See SORENSON, supra note 40 (estimating that 71% of the California parents who owed child
support arrears in March 2000 had at least one child support order set by default).
122 See Matt Welch, Injustice by Default: How the Effort to Catch "Deadbeat Dad's" Ruins
Innocent Men's Lives, REASON MAGAZINE, Feb. 2004, at 49 (explaining that although a balance of
science and modern convention must be established, if pitted against one another the law always defaults
to depriving the man instead of the child); see also SOLOMON-FEARS, supra note 28, at 48 (explaining that
Child Support Enforcement Agency culture viewed putative fathers as "riffraff").
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man might suffer."' 2 3 Given the facts, the analysis was incorrect. Once the
plaintiff discovered that he was not the child's father, he stopped seeking
custody and instead sought restitution; the parental bond was severed.
124
As a legal principle, the court's pitting of a man versus a child is
easily rejected; accepting the principle would make laws criminalizing
nonviolent crime by juveniles largely unenforceable; e.g., punishing a child
for stealing a man's car (financial harm) would surely expose the child to
psychic and emotional harm. 125 The principle is also shortsighted. Financial
harm to a man is likely to cause financial harm to any other children he may
be supporting, biological or not. 126  Worse still, the man versus child
principle is based on a hierarchy of parties. Stephen Douglas defended
slavery with the same decision by hierarchy approach, explaining that "in all
contests between the negro and the white man, he was for the white man."
127
If courts fashion themselves as policy makers, they do both men and children
alike a disservice by pitting them against one another. 28
D. Is the Child Support Debtor a Volunteer?
One family law professor has argued against mandatory paternity
testing because it might reduce the number of child support debtors, referring
to those debtors as "volunteers."'129 Volunteers, of course, are not entitled to
123 McBride, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
124 ld. at 118.
12 See id. at 123-24 (stating that if restitution was granted under these factual circumstances, the
result would be to prioritize the father's desire to be made whole rather than the needs of the child).
126 See Weaver v. Solone, No. FA980160460, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 63, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2760 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2006) (implying the effect child support debt might have on a parent's
ability to support their other children). The plaintiffs eldest child was diagnosed with a fatal genetic
disorder. In the course of genetic testing, he was excluded as the father of the eight year-old child for
whom he had been paying support. Id. at *5. He sought restitution so that he might be better able to care
for his oldest child. Id. at *6. The court, treating biologic paternity as one factor in a balancing test, gave
the father prospective relief but required that he pay the state arrearages. Id. at *23. See also Nicholas
Riccardi, DNA Shakes Up Child Support Law Rights: System is Challenged by Men Forced to Pay for
Children Who are Not Theirs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at 1 (discussing the response of one father, who
was paying support for his ex-girlfriend's child under a default paternity judgment, while also supporting
a wife and children: "[Tihe best interests of whose child? My children are suffering now.").
127 Saul Sigelschiffer, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: THE DRAMA OF THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS
DEBATES 394-95 (1973).
'2 See, e.g., Welch, supra note 122, at 49 (asserting that if the man and child are involved in a
dispute, the child wins by default, thus allowing no room for policy discussion).
129 See Murphy, supra note 33, at 376 (arguing that required genetic testing does not increase the
likelihood of a father's participation in a child's life because often the father doubts the biological link but
stays around nonetheless).
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restitution. 130  This characterization is wrong, and not just for the obvious
reason that the child support debtor is under legal compulsion to pay.
First, "a person who acts to protect their own legal interest, even
though it is ultimately determined that they were not liable, is not a
'volunteer' because their act was not truly voluntary."' 131 For example, in
Perkins v. Worzala, an insurer believed that it was liable and made
settlement payments to the defendant before its ultimate liability was
determined. 132  Because the insurer was later found to have no coverage
obligation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded the insurer restitution.'
133
Similarly, when a putative father acknowledges paternity he is acting to
protect his own legal interest, and a tremendously important one at that-his
parental rights.
Second, a party who acts due to a mistakenly perceived moral duty
to contribute is not a volunteer. 134 In Deskovick v. Porzio, the plaintiffs, at
their father's behest, paid a considerable amount of money in medical bills
for their father while he was still living. 135  After his death, the plaintiffs
discovered that they had been misled; the father could quite easily have paid
the bills himself. Because they had acted under a perceived moral duty,
rather than as volunteers, they had a restitution claim against the estate. 136 In
Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Detroit Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., after an insurer denied an insured's claim, the broker who
sold the policy to the insured paid the claim because of a perceived moral
obligation. 137 Upon determination that the insurer was legally compelled to
pay the claim, the broker recovered restitution against the insurer.
38
Similarly, a putative father is not a volunteer when he mistakenly
acknowledges paternity believing he has a moral obligation due to the false
belief of paternity.
130 See FISCHER, supra note 96, at § 43.1 (explaining that the "volunteer principle" related to
claims of unjust enrichment precludes the volunteer father from benefits of restitution absent "valid
reason").
131 Id.
132 Perkins v. Worzala, 143 N.W.2d 516,517 (Wis. 1966).
133 Id. at 518.
134 See FISCHER, supra note 96, at § 43.1 (explaining that when an individual acts pursuant to a
legal obligation to a legal obligation then they forfeit their status as a volunteer).
135 Deskovick v. Porzio, 187 A.2d 610, 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1963).
136 Id.; see also FISCHER, supra note 96, at § 4.2 (citing Deskovick for the principle that the law
does not treat persons acting under moral obligation as volunteers).
137 Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Detroit Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 59 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. 1953).
138 Id. at 82.
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The volunteer who wants to help support someone else's child can
join the Boy Scouts or the Big Brothers. 139 He is free to donate money to a
parent so that the parent might better support their child. The misattributed
child support debtor, however, is saddled with a disproportionate tax.14° A
taxpayer is unlikely to take pleasure from his contribution-despite the good
use to which tax dollars might be put-because legal compulsion is precisely
the way to deprive someone of the satisfaction of doing a good deed.14'
V. The Change-of-Position Defense
The initial question posed by this paper has been answered: When a
paternity judgment is reversed because a paternity test excludes the putative
father, he is entitled to restitution of the child support he paid under that
judgment, whether the recipient was the mother or the state. The applicable
restitutionary defense to his claim is the change-of-position defense.1
42
The defense, keeping with restitution law's aim of achieving justice,
allows a defendant who would otherwise be liable to avoid liability because
of a change in circumstances that would make the payment of restitution
inequitable. 43 Think back to the earlier example, where the bank mistakenly
deposited $500 into a customer's account and was entitled to restitution.1
44
Instead though, imagine the customer was expecting a $500 deposit and so
he withdrew the money. On the way home from the bank he was robbed. In
this instance, he can raise the change-of-position defense.
145
The change-of-position defense is usually unavailable to a defendant
who has consumed the benefit to be returned, which means that the benefit
139 See Henry, supra note 6, at 68 (positing that "a man who is free to follow his voluntary will in
pursuing a relationship with a child will have a better relationship than a man who is filled with rage and
resentment because he continues to be forced to make involuntary payments on the basis of a falsehood").
140 See supra Part ll.B. (describing the role of the misattributed child support debtor).
14 Many misidentified fathers refer to themselves not as volunteers but as victims. Camell Smith
founded U.S. Citizens Against Paternity Fraud (US-CAPF) as a grassroots organizations fighting for
paternity fraud legislation. See generally http://www.patemityfraud.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
142 See In re Marriage of Stem, 846 P.2d 1387, 1393-94 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a
statutory right to restitution of money paid under a judgment subsequently reversed extended to child
support orders, subject to the change-of-position defense).
143 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQurry, RESTITUTION § 4.6 (1993)
(stating if a "defendant reasonably changes position in reliance on [a] benefit so that liability for
restitution would be inequitable, his liability to make restitution is reduced or terminated accordingly").
144 See RENDLEMAN, supra note 10, at 431-32 (presenting a situation where a bank customer is
erroneously credited $500 due to a computer error).
145 See id. (describing when the change of position defense would be available to the customer).
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was used to increase her assets or reduce her liabilities. 146 The consumption
element is consistent with restitution's purpose. The claim for restitution is
effective for the very reason that the defendant is not entitled to retain a
benefit. As such, the defendant was not entitled to consume that benefit
either. The change-of-position defense is not a "but-I-spent-your-money-
already" defense. The consumption element bars states from using the
change-of-position defense because states use child support money to reduce
their welfare liabilities.
It seems that the consumption element would bar a mother from
using the defense too, and what if she simply cannot afford to pay back the
support? Mothers, despite the consumption element, are not necessarily
precluded from using the defense because a defendant's financial hardship,
her inability to return the benefit, can overcome her own consumption of that
benefit. 147  The financial hardship principle is codified in federal law:
"[Uindue hardship" may permit partial discharge of student loans in
bankruptcy. 148  Social security overpayments need not be repaid if
repayments would be "against equity and good conscience."'' 49 Indeed,
restitution's subsequent-reversal-of-judgment rule provides leeway for the
defendant's financial hardship to be considered: A plaintiff is entitled to
restitution "unless restitution would be inequitable."'' 50  Considering that
financial hardship is important-in some cases, requiring a defendant to
make restitution may cause a greater injustice than would providing the
plaintiff with no remedy.151
Financial hardship is an especially important consideration when the
mother is the defendant.1 Since child support money is given for current
support, as opposed to future support like a college trust, it is likely that
146 See DOBBS, supra note 143, at § 4.6 (noting that "[w]hen the benefit is consumed or expended
in ways that (a) do not increase assets or reduce liabilities . . . a strong equity appears in favor of the
recipient and the defense may be effective to bar restitution").
147 See id. (pointing out that particularly vulnerable defendants may receive favorable treatment).
148 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) (providing that there shall be no adjustment or recovery by the United
States if such person is without fault or "such recovery is ... against equity and good conscience").
149 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18, cmt. 12 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 2001).
151 See supra notes 161-62 (discussing compelling reasons not to require restitution).
152 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has defined financial hardship, or "undue hardship," in
the context of student loan discharge in bankruptcy as a situation in which "the debtor cannot maintain,
based on current income and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living for herself and her dependents if
forced to repay the loans." Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987).
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support money will have been spent by the time a restitution claim is
brought. Further, if the mother is still supporting the child then she may also
be losing support prospectively as result of a paternity disestablishment. The
loss of current and ongoing support coupled with liability for support
received is a recipe for financial hardship. Of course, the consideration is
irrelevant when the state is the defendant because it can always afford to pay
the money back.
A second hurdle exists for the defendant wanting to use the change-
of-position defense: The defendant who commits fraud is generally barred
from using it.' 53  The fraud bar makes sense. The change-of-position
defendant is given a pass, either because they never consumed the benefit, or
because they simply cannot afford to give it back. The defendant who gets
the benefit through fraud, however, does not deserve such a pass.
As discussed earlier, the fraud inquiry, in the context of paternity
disestablishment, is troublesome for various reasons. 154 First, a claim for
disestablishment may be brought years in the future; 55 stale evidence leads
to mistakes. Second, and more importantly, the majority of misattributed
paternity probably involves fraud on the mother's behalf if fraud is strictly
construed to mean concealment of a material fact to the detriment of the
plaintiff. 156 That material fact is the mother's sexual history. While some
women might be open with potential fathers as to the probability that they
have not fathered their children, many certainly are not. Even so, it is not
fair to expect women to divulge their sexual history in the context of a fraud
inquiry when there is no reciprocal duty placed on men. 157 Further, it is not
pragmatic because many women are unlikely to risk losing a mate to protect
this interest. 58 This clearly shows that the fraud inquiry, both in the context
of the restitution claim and the defense to it, is moot.
153 DOBBS, supra note 143, at § 4.6.
154 See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing why the fraud inquiry is unnecessary to determine the child
support debtor's substantive entitlement).
155 See supra Part n.C. (describing the approaches of different states towards paternity
disestablishment).
156 See supra note 93 (explaining that Black's Law Dictionary defines fraud as the "knowing
misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her
detriment").
157 See supra Part IV.B.2. (explaining that women are unlikely to divulge their sexual history and




This Note makes a modest claim: A man who pays child support
under a paternity judgment that is subsequently reversed-because a
paternity test excludes him as the father-is entitled to restitution. He is
entitled to full restitution should the recipient be the state. If the recipient is
the mother, he is entitled to restitution if she can afford to make it. Neither
the state nor the mother are precluded from collecting all of the support to
which they are rightfully entitled,1 59 but they will need to collect it from the
child's father, which is what should have happened in the first place.
The claim is modest because it requires only the application of a
rule-restitution law's subsequent-reversal-of-judgment rule-that is applied
"almost as a matter of course."'16 This Note has succeeded if it has managed
to identify and correct the errors that prevent some courts from applying this
rule. The claim reflects more than just a desire for legal precision. If forcing
a man to pay child support for another man's child is a "manifest injustice,"
refusing to return to him money he should never have had to pay in the first
place is a manifest injustice too.' 6 1 Awarding restitution achieves individual
justice, which is supposed to be the hallmark of our legal system.
Awarding restitution might also serve as an impetus for modernizing
legal mechanisms for paternity establishment.1 62 Today, although paternity
testing has become convenient and affordable, neither federal law nor the
law of any state requires a paternity test to establish paternity.163  Sans
testing, paternity is regularly misattributed. 64  Misattributed paternity is a
problem: it prevents the true father from developing a relationship with his
child, places the obligation of child support on the wrong man, and sets up
159 Suits to establish paternity may be brought any time before a child turns 18 years old. 42
U.S.C. § 666 (a)(5)(A)(i) (2000).
160 PALMER, supra note 62, § 9.9(b).
161 Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003) (vacating an order of child support
against ex-husband after a paternity test excluded him as the father of the child of the marriage).
162 Correctly identifying fathers the first time around might be less costly than misidentifying
fathers, paying them restitution, and then trying to collect from biological fathers. Even so, government
actors will not necessarily choose the most cost-effective course of action. See Daryl. J. Levinson,
Making Governments Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 419-20 (2000) (explaining that government actors respond to political incentives not financial
ones).
163 See supra note 38 (explaining that a party has the option to request genetic testing to determine
paternity upon showing of good cause).
164 See supra Part iI.B (describing the incidence of mistaken paternity).
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families for emotional trauma should the truth be discovered.
65
The legal system should not be indifferent as to whether it has
accurately imposed the tremendously important legal obligation of child
support. To grant restitution to misattributed putative fathers is a refusal to
tolerate that indifference. As this Note explains, courts need not consider
these policy implications at all; rather, courts can be part of the solution
simply by properly applying the law.
165 See supra Part m.C (describing emotional trauma from incorrect results).
